

ii. IN PERSIAN LITERATURE

The term 'aql (which will be translated as intellect throughout) is widely discussed in Islamic texts, a fact that is hardly surprising since knowledge (*ʿilm*), which is the content of intellect if not in some way identical with it, is central to Islamic civilization and dominates "over all aspects of Muslim intellectual, spiritual and social life" (F. Rosenthal, *Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam*, Leiden, 1970, p. 334).

Definitions of intellect and disputes over what exactly is denoted by the word are common in the works of various authorities in the different sciences. It is often divided into several kinds. For the philosophical discussion, see above (see also S. M. Afān, *A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic*, Beirut, 1969, pp. 178-85). The famous theologian Abū Ḥāmed Gazzālī (d. 505/1111) suggests that one of the reasons for difference of opinion over the nature of the intellect is that the word 'aql denotes four different realities (*Ehya' ulim al-din*, Cairo, 1327/1909, I, p. 64): 1. The attribute which distinguishes human beings from animals and makes them capable of learning arts and sciences; as such, intellect is an innate capacity (*fiṭra*) that is related to knowledge as the eye is related to vision. 2. Knowledge that is possessed innately by children once they have gained a certain power of discernment, e.g. that two of a thing are more than one. 3. Knowledge that gained through experience. 4. The understanding by man's innate capacity for knowledge that all affairs have certain consequences and that passion and self-interest must be restrained. The first of these kinds of intellect, says Gazzālī, is the foundation and source, the second the initial consequence of the first, the third the consequence of the first and second combined, and the fourth the ultimate fruit and final goal. The first two are innate, while the third and fourth are acquired (Gazzālī then quotes three verses from 'Alī b. Alī Ṭāleb that provide a traditional basis for this classification: Abū Ṭāleb Maḳrī *Qūṭ al-ḡolab*, Cairo, 1961, I, p. 324) quotes the same verses with the word *ʿilm* in place of 'aql; see the translation by Rosenthal, *Knowledge Triumphant*, p. 184).

In the early Islamic texts and in discussions by authorities such as Gazzālī, intellect is accorded a highly positive role. Nevertheless, in Persian literature and in Sufism in general, intellect is often criticized for its shortcomings, especially in the face of love (*ʿaşq*, *mudhabbab*); the remainder of the present entry will deal mainly with the theme of the contrast between intellect and love.

Although the word *aql* as such is not found in the Koran, various verbal forms (e.g., *yāʿ qalib*) occur forty-nine times, always in a positive sense. Through intellect mankind understands the signs (*āyāt*) of God, whether in the phenomena of nature (Koran 2:164, 13:4, 16:12, 23:80, etc.), or in the Koran and other scriptures (2:44, 3:65, 3:118, 10:16, 11:51, etc.). Intellect prevents man from falling into hell (67:10) and allows him to understand that the next world is better than this (6:32,

7:161, 12:109, 28:60). The wisest of creatures in God's sight are those who have no intellect (3:22). Intellect's importance is enhanced by the fact that commentators identify the *labib* possessed by the *zill* *ʿal-abḥā*, mentioned in sixteen verses, with intellect: a typical verse reads, "Are they equal—those who know and those who know not? Only the *zill* *ʿal-abḥ* (the possessors of intellects) remember" (39:9).

The very few Hadiths in the primary Sunni collections referring to intellect always mention it in the same positive sense that is seen in the Koran. Later works add numerous examples of Hadith in praise of 'aql (e.g., Gazzālī, *Ehya' ʿilm*, pp. 63-64). The Shi'ite Hadith collections are particularly rich in traditions praising intellect (see Majlesi, *Behār al-anwār*, repr. Beirut, 1983, I, *Keṯāb al-'aql wa'l-jahl*, pp. 81-162). In both Shi'ite and Sunni Hadiths, the connection between intellect and sound religious faith and practice is stressed. Thus Gazzālī (loc. cit.) quotes the Prophet as saying that the pillar of the believer is his intellect, which determines the measure of his worship (*ʿabdāq*). Similarly Imām Ja'far al-Ṣādeq defines intellect as "That through which the All-Merciful is worshiped and Paradise is attained" (Majlesi, *Behār* I, p. 116). The Shi'ite sources emphasize the idea that all positive moral qualities depend upon intellect; the lists of these qualities seem to be prototypical for the later discussions of the *maqāmat* or "stations" of spiritual perfection in Sufism (cf. the one hundred branches of intellect according to the Prophet, *ibid.*, pp. 117-19, or the seventy-five soldiers of intellect—as opposed to the seventy-five soldiers of *jahl* "ignorance"—according to Imām Ja'far, *ibid.*, pp. 109-11).

Though intellect is highly praised in the early sources, it is always recognized as a creature of God, who has no equals. Hence intellect must have certain limitations; among these are the fact that God Himself can only be known to the intellect to the extent that He chooses to reveal Himself to it, either through scripture or through the created world. But man as a possessor of intellect will never be able to comprehend God as He is in Himself; the verse "They measure not God with His true measure" (Koran 22:74) is often cited to prove this point. Similarly, a prophetic Hadith that is sometimes quoted in this context states, "Meditate (*tafakkur*) upon God's creation (or: God's bounties), but not upon God (or: upon God's Essence)" (Gazzālī, *Kimāz-ye sar'adāri*, ed. A. Ārām, Tehran, 1319 Š./1940, p. 779). 'Alī's *Nahj al-balāḡa* contains several passages alluding to the intellect's inability to grasp true knowledge of God (ed. S. Saleh, Beirut, 1387/1967, pp. 217, 225, 238; cf. W. Chittick, *A Shi'ite Anthology*, Albany, 1981, pp. 28, 32, on the whole question of man's ability to know God in the Islamic context, see Rosenthal, *Knowledge Triumphant*, pp. 129-42). In general, the great emphasis placed by *kalām* upon the concept of *ʿanzā* or "incomparability," the idea that God is dissimilar to created things and transcends our understanding, is closely connected to the inability of the intellect to reach a true comprehension of God's inmost nature (*konh*), however necessary intellect may be in order for the individual to

establish sound religious faith and practice. Many early Sufis also allude to the limitations of intellect. Thus Abū'l-Ḥasan Nūrī (d. 295/908) said that the intellect is "impotent" (*'āqez*), and this impotent can only point to that which, like itself, is impotent" (*Kāšān-ye šāh-e ta'arof*, ed. A. 'A. Rāfiā, Tehran, 1349 Š./1970, p. 155; cf. J. Nurhakhsh, *Sufism: Meaning, Knowledge, and Unity*, New York, 1981, pp. 46-47; Kalāhādī, *The Doctrine of the Sufis*, tr. A. J. Arberry, Lahore, 1966, pp. 51-55).

Intellect was also suspect because the philosophers and many of the theologians claimed to base their doctrines upon its findings, while the majority of the community felt that these thinkers had strayed far from the letter and spirit of Islam; "man of intellect" (*'aql*) is often a derogatory term alluding to a rationalistic thinker or philosopher, someone who is perceived as placing intellect even above revelation. Thus we find Sanā'ī (d. 525/1130-31) writing that intellect is blind in religious love: "Exercising intellect (*'aql*) is the work of Ebn Sīnā (Avicenna)" (*Hādāqat al-haqīqa*, ed. M. T. Modarres Razāwī, Tehran, 1329 Š./1950, pp. 300-01). In his *Dh̄wān*, Sanā'ī stresses the superiority of the *Šar'ā* over intellect and remarks that Avicenna will not be able to provide you with *šēfā* and *nojāta* ("healing" and "salvation" – the titles of two of Avicenna's works; *Dh̄wān*, ed. idem, Tehran, 1341 Š./1962, p. 43; cf. pp. 57, 127). In a similar way he points out that intellect is useless without revelation and that the "partial intellect (*aql-e jozwī*) cannot encompass the K.oran: How can a spider share a phoenix?" (p. 191). Criticisms of Avicenna as the archetypal '*aql*' are made by Kāqānī (*Tadh̄āat al-'Erāqiyān*, ed. Y. Qarīb, Tehran, 1333 Š./1954, pp. 65-66) and Rūmī (*Mā'ānawī*, ed. R. A. Nicholson, London, 1925-40, IV, v, 506; cf. 'Aḥār's arguments that the philosopher's intellect takes him outside of Moḥammad's religion; *Asrār-nāma*, ed. Š. Goybāhānī, Tehran, 1338 Š./1959, pp. 49-51, especially v. 801). In a famous verse (*Mā'ānawī* V, v. 4144) Rūmī places Fakr-al-dīn Rāzī, the great theologian, in the same category; he seems to be repeating the sentiment of his celebrated comparison Sams Tabrīzī, who remarks, "If these meanings (*ma'ānā*) could be perceived through study and discussion, then Bāyzād and Jorjād should heap all the dirt in the world on their own heads in regret for [not having attained the rank of] Fakr Rāzī" (*Maqāzāt*, ed. M. 'A. Mowājhed, Tehran, 2536 = 1356 Š./1977, p. 135; on the complicated problem of whether or not the Sufis' criticism of intellect was justified, see S. H. Nasr, "The Relation between Sufism and Philosophy in Persian Culture," *Hamdard Islamicus* 6/4, 1983, pp. 33-47).

When Persian poets look at the positive side of intellect and praise its role in supporting religious faith and practice, they are often being influenced not only by the picture of the intellect drawn in the Koran and the early religious literature, but also by the praise that was lavished upon it in Iranian sources (where *kerād* [Pahl. *xrad*, q.v.] is used interchangeably with *'aql*; see Adab; Andarz) and in Greek wisdom literature. Whatever the

extent of this sort of influence, it served to accentuate the positive role given to intellect in Islam. A glance at Wolff's concordance of the *Šāh-nāma* shows almost 1000 instances of the use of *kerād* and various derivatives, such as *kerādmānd* (= '*aql*'), invariably in a positive sense (F. Wolf, *Glossar zu Firdausi's Schahname*, Hildesheim, 1965; cf. M. Dabirsiāqī, *Kāšf al-abḥāṭ-e Šāh-nāma-ye Ferdowsī*, Tehran, 1348-50 Š./1969-71, II, pp. 461-63; for the first *meqrō's* of about one hundred lines beginning with *kerād*), Nāḡer Kōstow (d. 481/1088-89), who was well versed in Pārsiparctic philosophy, praises intellect in numerous verses as man's indispensable companion in religion (e.g., *Dh̄wān*, ed. M. Mīnōvī and M. Moḥaqeq, Tehran, 1353 Š./1974, pp. 44, 84, 270, 273, 313, 452, 453).

But the Persian poets could not ignore intellect's weakness and incapacity in the face of God Himself; this negative side of '*aql*' came to be expressed most vocally in discussions of love (see Fīq), which was considered to be opposed to the intellect from early times. The connection between love and madness (*fonān*), and the fact that the latter is the opposite of rationality ('*aql*, '*aql*'), was clear to everyone; the story of Laylā and Majnūn serves as the mythical expression of this understanding. Already Ferdowsī refers to the coming of love as coinciding with the departure of intellect (*Šāh-nāma*, ed. Borjnīkm, I, p. 152, v. 441). Similar verses can be found in Fakr-al-dīn As'ad Gorḡānī's *Yūs (Wāys) o Rāmīn* (ed. M. M. Todua and A. A. Gvarkharīa, Tehran, 1349 Š./1970, pp. 94, 117-118), written in about 446/1054. Thus, "Intellect discerns good from bad, but when love comes, no intellect remains in the heart" (p. 117; most authorities locate intellect in the heart, not the mind; thus also K.oran 22-46). Eventually the contrast between love and the intellect becomes a standard motif in the Persian *gazzal*.

Given Islam's tremendous emphasis upon the positive role of intellect, it might be expected that the "Islamic" view would be to denigrate love whenever it acts in opposition to intellect, and this is indeed the tenor of such works as Ebn al-Jawzī's *Ḍamm al-hawā* (see J. N. Bell, *Love Theory in Later Hanbali Islam*, Albany, 1979, p. 37). But Sufism had long emphasized the importance of love for God over all other human attributes. A respected master of *kalām* like Abū Ḥāmed Gazzālī could write, "Love for God is the ultimate goal of the spiritual stations (*maqāmat*).... Every station beyond it is one of its fruits, and every station before it leads up to it" (*Eḡyār* IV, p. 209).

As the Sufis increasingly wrote about the central importance of love in religion, they adopted the imagery and themes employed in poetry and prose to describe a man's love for a woman. Of seminal importance here for the development of Persian literature is the *Sawāneḥ*, a masterpiece of prose by Abū Ḥāmed's younger brother Ahmad Gazzālī (d. 520/1126). His succinct observation on intellect in this work sets the tone for all subsequent treatments of mystical love: Alluding to the Koranic verse, "They will ask you about

the spirit, say: "The spirit is from the command of my Lord, and of knowledge you have been given but a little" (17:85), he writes that intellect's eyes are shut toward the preception of the spirit (*ruh*, *ruh*), which is the shell surrounding love: "Since knowledge has no access to the shell, how should it find its way to the pearl hidden within?" (*Sawmeh*, ed. N. Purjavadi, Tehran, 1359 Š./1980, p. 55; cf. pp. 42-43; cf. also his *Bohr al-haqiqa*, ed. idem, Tehran, 1977, pp. 2, 6). The theory of intellect's relation to love was greatly elaborated by Ahmad Gazzali's disciple, 'Ayn-al-qozai Hamadani (d. 525/1131), especially in his Arabic *Zohdat al-haqiqat* (ed. 'A. Osayran, Tehran, 1341 Š./1962, pp. 25-36), where he explains that love belongs to a stage of human perfection "beyond the stage of the intellect" (*war' iawr al-'aql*). Hamadani's much longer Persian work, *Tamhidi*, is devoted largely to explaining the nature of love and the imagery that is used to express it; the limitations of intellect are implicit throughout the discussion, but mentioned explicitly only in a few lines of poetry (*Tamhidi*, published with *Zohdat al-haqiqat*, pp. 116, 157).

Among poets, 'Ayn-al-qozai's contemporary Sanā'i continues the tradition of praising intellect as man's great aid in religion (see *Hasidat al-haqiqa* chap. 4, pp. 293-314). But he pointedly distinguishes between the intellect that takes man to God and the counterfeit intellect that is possessed by the devil (p. 303). He describes the spiritual ascent of the man who seeks refuge in intellect, "becomes a sun through intellect's shadow," then gains the robe of fervent desire (*shawq*) for God and passes beyond even the Universal Intellect, God's first creation (p. 308). At the beginning of the *Hasidat*, Sanā'i had alluded to the inability of intellect to grasp the true nature of God (p. 16; this admission of intellect's impotence becomes a standard feature of the sections on *lawhid* that begin so many *madhams*, cf., e.g., J. A. Boyle, tr., *The Ithi'asna or Book of God of Farid al-Din 'Attar*, Manchester, 1976, pp. 1-2; G. M. Wickens, tr., *Morals Poetized and Tales Adorned: The Bustan of Sa'di*, Toronto, 1974, pp. 5-6). In chapter five of the *Hasidat*, Sanā'i tells us that love is beyond intellect and spirit and that it transcends the dualities that intellect discerns, such as faith and infidelity (p. 328). Sanā'i's *Divan* devotes a far larger proportion of its verses to love than does the *Hasidat*, so in general it is more critical of intellect. Love deals with a domain beyond intellect; the latter asks about the licit and the illicit, while the former is only interested in "non-existence" (p. 337). In other words, the lover of God must smash the snare of everything other than his Beloved (including his own self): "Call everything other than love 'heartache' (*gamm*)" (p. 499).

Sanā'i's verses set the pattern for the contrast between intellect and love in Persian poetry. However, he also emphasizes the cosmological role of intellect, and this in turn becomes a common feature of Persian verse, especially among Sufis. The Hadith stating that God's first creation was intellect is found in both Sunni and Shi'ite sources, though its authenticity was questioned

by some of the *shaykhs*. It was often quoted by the philosophers, who found in it a confirmation of Neoplatonic teachings, and Sanā'i was well versed in the philosophical tradition (J. T. P. de Bruijn, *Of Poetry and Poetry: The Interaction of Religion and Literature in the Life and Works of Hakim Sanā'i of Ghazna*, Leiden, 1983, pp. 208ff.). Like later Sufis, Sanā'i was happy to make use of philosophical views to explain Islam's vision of man's origin and destiny. Thus he speaks of the Intellect as the cause of all existent things (*Hasidat*, p. 295) and alludes to the Universal Intellect as the closest thing to God (p. 298). In his *Sayr al-'shad el-i'lmia* (ed. Modarres Raza'i in *Madhams-ha-ye Hakim Sanā'i*, Tehran, 1348 Š./1969, pp. 212-14), he describes the cosmological role of the *'aql-e koll* (or *kollif*) in some detail.

'Attar (d. 618/1220) devotes his *Divan* and *madhams* mainly to love and its concomitants, so he seldom speaks of the positive side of intellect, emphasizing instead its incapacity in the face of love, the intoxication produced by love's wine, and the madness and bewilderment (*hagrat*) that overcome the lover at the vision of his Beloved's face (e.g., *Mariyat al-ayr*, ed. Š. Gowharfi, Tehran, 1342 Š./1963, pp. 186-87; *Ast'ar-nama*, ed. Ydem, Tehran, 1338 Š./1959, p. 35; *Divan*, ed. T. Tāzozli, Tehran, 1345 Š./1966, pp. 6, 12, 31, 32, 38, 53, 56, 57, 61, 72, 77, 78, 82, 108, 110, 135, 136, 150, 156, 169, 176, 192, 200, 209, 216, 235, 241, 243, 271, 283, 296, 299, etc.). In contrast to Sanā'i, 'Attar rarely refers to intellect's role in the cosmos.

Among 'Attar's contemporaries, a number of important prose writers contributed to the discussion of intellect's relation to love. Though the master prose stylist Šahāb-al-dīn Sohravardī (d. 587/1191) writes constantly of intellect in his mystical treatise (*Madhams-ye 'āzār-e-farā*, ed. S. H. Nasr, 2nd. ed., Tehran, 1977, index; cf. W. M. Thackston, Jr., tr., *The Mystical and Visionary Treatises of Sohravardī*, London, 1982, passim), his emphasis is upon the positive role of intellect as the source of the knowledge that brings about spiritual transformation, and here he is influenced not only by Sufi ideas of spiritual realization but also by Avicenna's cosmology and psychology; in Sohravardī's view, the Active Intellect, identified as Gabriel in the angelic hierarchy, is man's inward guide to felicity (see 'Aql-e Sorfi); Rūzbehan Baqlī (d. 606/1209), a great theoretician of love, has little to say in criticism of intellect other than to acknowledge that it is a stranger (*ūghān*) to God (*Golzi'at al-salakat*, ed. J. Nūrbağī, with *Resālat al-gods*, Tehran, 1351 Š./1972, p. 83); however, he praises intellect as the instrument of man's servanthood and classifies it into four different kinds, showing that the highest kind belongs to the prophets and saints (*Resālat al-gods*, pp. 71-74). The Sufi Najm-al-dīn Rāzī (d. 654/1256) provides a detailed and systematic discussion of the relationship between love and intellect in his *'Esq o 'aql* (ed. T. Tāzozli, Tehran, 1345 Š./1966), explaining the cosmological basis for love's superiority. He concludes that intellect concerns itself with discernment and separation among things and thus with

plurality and the establishment of this world, but love bridges gaps and annihilates multiplicity. The opposition (*zaddiyat*) between intellect and love is based upon the fact that "Intellect is the great champion (*qahraman*) of constructing the two worlds, corporeal and spiritual, while love is a fire that consumes the haystack and overthrows the existence of both these worlds" (p. 63). Hence love carries the lover to the Beloved on the feet of effacement of the self (*nisf*), but intellect cannot take its possessor farther than its own object: "And all men of knowledge and wisdom agree that God cannot be the object of anyone's intellect" (ibid.; cf. Rāzi's explanation of the conflict between love and intellect in *The Path of God's Bondsmen*, tr. H. Algar, Delmar, N. Y., 1982, pp. 87-90).

One of the subtlest and most detailed discussions of the relationship between intellect and love is found scattered throughout the works of Jalāl-al-dīn Rūmī (d. 672/1273). The ideas he expresses and the poetical imagery that he employs mark the highpoint of this tradition; for the most part the poets who come after him contribute to discussions of intellect not by offering new concepts or imagery but by refining the literary technique. It is also true that Sūfi writing after Rūmī undergoes profound changes because of the influx into Persian of Ebn al-'Arabī's ideas and terminology, but this has little if any effect on the tradition of contrasting love and intellect (e.g., a poet like Mağribī (d. 809/1406-07) is totally dominated by Ebn al-'Arabī's teachings, but in the few instances where he alludes to the opposition between love and intellect, his concepts and images are no different from those of earlier poets. *Divān-e kamel-e Sams-e Mağribī*, ed. A. Mir 'Abedini, Tehran, 1358 Š./1979, *ğazzals*, vv. 43, 478, 744, 789, 1111, 1330, 1336; *tanfīzāt*, vv. 52, 160-85). Ebn al-'Arabī and his followers place far less emphasis upon love than do Sūfi poets such as Sanā'ī, 'Aṭfār, and Rūmī; they were far more concerned with the construction of an elaborate theory of the nature of existence, and here intellect plays a major role, at least cosmologically. But intellect and the knowledge it is able to acquire are always subordinated to knowledge received directly from God, most often referred to as *kāfī* "unveiling" (see, e.g., Ebn al-'Arabī, *al-Fotūḥat al-makkiyya*, Beirut, n.d., I, pp. 91-92; tr. Roseman, *Knowledge Triumphs*, pp. 188-92. For a Persian example of this school's writings, see Šadr-al-dīn Qīnawī, *Majālī'e inḥā*, ed. W. Chittick, *Sophia Perennis* 4/1, 1978, pp. 71-72; cf. Chittick, "Mysticism vs. Philosophy in Earlier Islamic History," *Religious Studies* 17, 1981, esp. pp. 89-95).

Rūmī acknowledges that in the end love is superior to intellect, but he never ignores intellect's positive dimension. Even more than Sanā'ī or Najm-al-dīn Rāzī he gives intellect a clear role to play in the cosmos and in the stages of spiritual growth undergone by the traveler (*sālik*). He teaches that intellect is one in substance with the angels and is constantly engaged in seeking God; he contrasts it with the ego (*nafs*), which was originally one substance with Satan. Most men are veiled from the light of intellect by their egos; hence

their intellects are in fact partial, while only the prophets and saints have reestablished contact with the Universal Intellect, through which all things were created. If intellect has a negative side, it is because "the partial intellect has disgraced the Intellect" (*Madhawī* V, v. 463). But in spite of the intellect's fundamentally positive role, it must eventually be left behind in the quest for God. Just as Gabriel could only go so far in guiding the Prophet on his celestial ascent (*ma'raj*), so the intellect must be finally naughted, since it pertains to creation and therefore duality. The intellect takes the saints to the Lote Tree of the Far Boundary (ibid., VI, v. 4139; cf. Koran 53:14), but "Intellect is a shadow, God the sun: How can the shadow stand up to the sun?" (ibid., IV, v. 2111). Hence Rūmī devotes many lines, especially in his *Divān*, to criticizing intellect from the point of view of love, which burns away all multiplicity and leaves only the One God. Rūmī also makes clear the close connection between sobriety and intellect on the one hand and intoxication and love on the other: "The form of intellect is all stricture of heart, but the form of love is nothing but drunkenness" (*Divān*, v. 33781).

Bibliography: See also A. Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*, Chapel Hill, 1975, pp. 18-20 and passim. Idem, *The Triumphal Sun: A Study of the Works of Jalāludīn Rūmī*, London, 1976, pp. 336-38 and index, s.v. intellect. Idem, *As Through a Veil*, New York, 1982, pp. 66-67, 78, 126-29. On intellect in Rūmī see Chittick, *The Sūfi Path of Love*, Albany, 1983, pp. 33-37, 65-68, 88-92, 220-31, 318-23, and index.

(W. C. CHITTIK)

'AQL-E-SORK, "The Crimsoned Archangel" (lit., "The Red Intellect"), title of one of the visionary recitals or treatises on spiritual initiation of Sayḡ-al-šīrāq Šehab-al-dīn Yahyā Sohravardī Maqūlī (d. 587/1191). The Arabic word *ʿaql* corresponds to the Greek *noia* and Latin *intelligentia intellectus* (not "reason"), while the "hierarchical intelligences" (*ʿoqūl*) of the Muslim Neoplatonists are traditionally identified with the archangelic entities known as Cherubim (Karūbiān). In this treatise the intellect, or rather, the archangel, is presented haloted in red (*sonḡ*), symbolism connected to the mixture of night and day found in the evening, for the archangel stands at the boundary between the spiritual and the material worlds. The archangel is at the same time the philosophers' "active intelligence" (*ʿaql faʿʿāl*), which is the tenth in the hierarchy of the Cherubim and the angel of the human race (*raḥb al-ḥawʿ al-ʿinsānī*), and the figure that the theologians call the Holy Spirit, or Gabriel; it is both angel of knowledge and angel of revelation. It dominates Sohravardī's *ʿaṣṣāq* philosophy, which combines philosophic research and mystical experience; hence in his long treatises Sohravardī expounds his doctrine, while in his shorter works he shows how the doctrine is gradually mastered by the soul. The visionary recitals are concerned not simply with a theory of knowledge or of cosmology, but with meeting with the angel. The